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Municipal Corporations-Duty to Keep Streets Safe by
Warnings and Guards-Proximate Cause.
In Haney v. Town of Lincolnton1 plaintiff's intestate was killed
when a car in which she was a passenger was driven along a city
street and over an embankment opposite the point at which the street
terminated by intersecting a highway at right angles. The night was
dark, wet, and foggy. Held, by the North Carolina Supreme Court
in reversing judgment for the plaintiff, that the defendant municipal-
ity's demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained, as the de-
fendant was not negligent in failing to give warning or to place a guard
at the street end, and even if negligent its conduct was insulated by
the negligence of the driver of the car, which was the immediate cause
of the accident.
North Carolina, in accord with most states, recognizes a duty on a
municipality to exercise reasonable care to maintain its streets in a
reasonably 2 safe condition,3 which includes the provision of proper
railings, barriers, or other reasonably necessary signals to warn and
guard the traveller against dangerous embankments, excavations, etc.,
contiguous to the street.4 Ordinarily the question of the municipal-
ity's negligence in failing to provide warnings or guards5 is for the jury
to determine from the circumstances.6 In the present case, in view of
1207 N. C. 282, 176 S. E. 573 (1934).
'A municipality is not the insurer of the absolute safety of its streets. Reuther
v. State, 125 Misc. Rep. 773, 214 N. Y. S. 783 (1926) ; Fitzgerald v. Concord, 140
N. C. 110,, 52 S. E. 309 (1905); Willis v. New Bern, 191 N. C. 507, 132 S. E.
286 (1926).
'Russell v. Monroe, 116 N. C. 721, 21 S. E. 550 (1895) (ditch in sidewalk);
Fitzgerald v, Concord, 140 N. C. 110, 52 S. E. 309 (1905) (defective culvert in
street) ; Johnson v. Raleigh, 156 N. C. 269, 72 S. E. 368 (1911) (hole in street) ;
Bailey v. Winston, 157 N. C. 252, 72 S. E. 966 (1911) (ditch in sidewalk) ; Mi-
chaux v. Rocky Mount, 193 N. C. 550, 137 S. E. 663 (1927) (bridge washout).
'Bunch v. Edenton, 90 N. C. 431 (1884) (city liable where plaintiff fell into
excavation near sidewalk); Willis v. New Bern, 191 N. C. 507, 132 S. E. 286
(1926) (city liable where plaintiff drove off end of street abruptly terminating
without lights or barrier in a river).
'In some cases it is not clear whether the court is referring to the duty of
notification or to the duty of fortification. Briglia v. City of St. Paul, 134 Minn.
97, 158 N. W. 794 (1916). Other cases clearly refer to the duty of notification,
Prather v. City of Spokane, 29 Wash. 549, 70 Pac. 55 (1902), and others dearly
to the duty of fortification, City of Milledgeville v. Holloway, 32 Ga. App. 734,
124 S. E. 802 (1924). City of Phoenix v. Mayfield, 20 P. (2d) 296 (Ariz. 1933)
seems to refer to both duties, as does the principal case. Watkin's Adm'r v. City
of Catlettsburg, 243 Ky. 197, 47 S. W. (2d) 1032 (1932) cites a number of cases
in holding that where there is no concealment and the condition is obvious there
is no duty on a city to maintain a barrier strong enough to keep a car from going
over an embankment.
'Horton v. McDonald, 105 Conn. 356, 135 Atl. 442 (1926) (plaintiff's car
backed over an embankment twenty feet from middle of the street when she
stopped at an intersection to shift gears) ; Bond v. Inhabitants of Billerica, 235
Mass. 119, 126 N. E. 281 (1920) (evidence sufficient for jury to find city negli-
gent where car went over embankment at curve); Nelson v. City of Duluth,
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the "semi-dead end" street,7 a sloping embankment opposite a right
angle turn, a dirt shoulder between the embankment and the highway,
and no lights, signs, or barriers to warn of the necessity of turning or
the existence of the embankment, the lower court should have been
sustained in submitting the case to the jury.8
Furthermore, the court held that even assuming that the city was
inactively negligent, yet its conduct was insulated by the intervention
of the active negligence of the driver of the car. North Carolina9 has
previously adhered to the general rule that the municipality is liable
where two causes concur in producing injury, one of them being a
culpable defect in the street, and the other, the active negligence of a
third party.1 0 However, the court probably means, instead of there be-
ing concurrent causes, that here the driver's negligence was the sole
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Although approval is given to
the bare statement that the interposition of independent, responsible
172 Minn. 76, 214 N. W. 774 (1927) (city liable for not providing warning or
guard at a cliff near an S-curve in road) ; Corcoran v. City of New York, 188
N. Y. 131, 80 N. E. 660 (1907)' (higher court reversed judgment of nonsuit and
ordered new trial where car at nighttime crashed through fence at end of street
and over an embankment).
"Bean v. City of Portland, 109 Me. 467, 84 Atl. 981 (1912) (plaintiff at night
drove over an unguarded embankment at the end of a street) ; Corcoran v. City of
New York, 188 N. Y. 131, 80 N. E. 660 (1907) (car crashed through fence at
end of street and over an embankment) ; Willis v. New Bern, 191 N. C. 507, 132
S. E. 286 (1926) (city liable where plaintiff drove off the end of street abruptly
terminating without lights or arrier in a river).
SComparethe facts in Ivory v. Town of Deer Park, 116 N. Y. 476, 22 N. E.
1080 (1889) where there was no ditch or barrier between a curve and an excava-
tion within eleven feet of the beaten track. Plaintiff's horses failed to make the
turn one night and fell into the excavation. The jury's finding of negligence on
the city's part was not disturbed by the higher court. But cf. Briglia v. City of
St. Paul, 134 Minn. 97, 158 N. W. 794 (1916), where, as in the principal case, a
street intersected but did not cross another street and there was a bluff opposite
this point of intersection. However, the distinction in the facts is that the car
was driven along the boulevard and then turned into the street for some few feet,
and then it began backing across the intersection, sidewalk, and over the bluff.
The higher court held that the verdict was properly directed for, the defendant.9 Speas v. City of Grensboro, 204 N. C. 239, 167 S. E. 807 (1930) (city held
liable in an action by a passenger in a car which hit a "silent policeman" negli-
gently maintained with lights off at an intersection, even though the driver also
was liable for his negligence). This rule also was applied where an innocent
cause or occurrence combined with the defect in the street. Dillon v. City of
Raleigh, 124 N. C. 184, 32 S. E. 548 (1899) (Plaintiff's horse became frightened
and hit railroad trestle stringers negligently left in the street. Held, the city is
liable even though the defect in street combined with running of horse).
" Whitlach v. City of Iowa Falls, 199 Iowa 73, 201 N. W. 83 (1924) ; Thomas
v. City of Lexington, 150 So. 816 (Miss. 1933) ; King v. Douglas County, 114
Neb. 477, 208 N. W. 120 (1928).
However, some states in actions arising under a statute making a city liable for
injury by or through a defect in a street allow recovery where the defect combines
with an innocent occurrence in causing injury, Jennes v. City of Norwich, 107
Conn. 79, 140 At1. 119 (1927) ; but deny it where the defect combines with the
negligence or fault of a third party, Bartrarm, v. Town of Sharon, 71 Conn. 686,
43 AtI. 143 (1899).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
human conduct between the injury and the original wrongdoer's neg-
ligence insulates the latter, it is doubtful if the court would deny the
oft-stated proposition that if the intervening act and resultant injury
could reasonably have been foreseen 'by the defendant he remains
liable." This test of foreseeability, which is a proper test for neg-
ligence, is improperly used in many cases as a test for-proximate cause. 12
It is true that if the driver's negligence alone would have caused the
injury the city is not liable,13 but if the defendant had performed its
duty of fortifying against danger it seems unreasonable to say that this
accident would have happened anyway, if the car was being operated
at a speed of only fifteen or twenty miles an hour.
Although the inquiry here is almost entirely a factual one the pres-
ent decision is to be regretted as a deterrent rather than a spur to action
by the new expense-wary North Carolina municipality towards main-
tenance of its streets in a safe condition. If the increasing tide of fatal
accidents 14 is to be checked a higher degree of care must be exercised,
both in the operation of vehicles, and in the maintenance of the streets
and highways, which includes all proper warnings and guards at sharp
turns and intersections. It is to be hoped that the present financial
condition of most North Carolina municipalities will not lead the court
to lighten the obligation of the municipality, which in terms of the safe-
guarding of human life is still far from being too onerous.
J. A. KLEEMEIER, JR.
Harton v. Telephone Co., 141 N. C. 455, 54 S. E. 299 (1906) (higher court
reversed ruling for defendant and ordered new trial where defendant's defective
telephone p6le broke and fell in the road, and after being propped up by a traveler
fell again killing plaintiff's intestate) ; Hinnant v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 202
N. C. 489, 163 S. E. 555 (1932) (recovery against railroad denied where engineer
was negligent in failing to blow whistle, and driver of car in which plaintiff was
passenger was negligent in driving too fast toward a grade crossing on a wet clay
road).
I That foreseeability is a test for negligence but not proximate cause is recog-
nized in England. In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd. [1921], 3 K. B.
560; Bumrcx, ToRTs (1926) 21. See Gax, RATIoNALE OF PROXImATa CAUSE
(1927) 81, 83.
North Carolina has applied the test of foreseeability to the problem of cause in
some cases. Doggett v. Richmond & Danville R. Co., 78 N. C. 305 (1878) (where
in an action against the railroad for destruction of plaintiff's fence by fire it
appeared that plaintiff's fence was three-fourths of a mile from the fence first
ignited by sparks from defendant's engine, but was connected with it by a con-
tinuous line of fences of other owners. Held, defendant's negligence is remote,
and this was not such a probable consequence as should have been reasonably
foreseen) ; Harton v. Telephone Co. 141 N. C. 455, 54 S. E. 299 (1906) ; Herman v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 197 N. C. 718, 150 S. E. 361 (1929) (recovery denied
passenger in car which struck defendant's train as driver's negligence was the
sole proximate cause, being unforeseeable) ; Hinnant v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
202 N. C. 489, 163 S. E. 555 (1932).
"City of Douglas v. Burden, 24 Ariz. 95, 206 Pac. 1085 (1922) ; City of Ham-
ilton v. Dilley, 30 Ohio App. 558, 166 N. E. 147 (1928) ; Dillon v. Raleigh, 124
N. C. 184, 32 S. E. 548 (1899).
" See dissenting opinion by Clarkson, J. in the principal case.
